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1 Introduction
Is it really dangerous for firms’ shareholders to delegate control over their
assets to managers who are interested in expanding sales or market shares,
but not particularly (if at all) interested in maximising the market value of
the capital stock? This issue has been the focus of the literature on agency
relationships,1 stressing the need for the shareholders to design incentive
contracts so as to align as much as possible to the objective of profit maximi-
sation the behaviour of potentially misbehaving managers, under asymmetric
information. An alternative albeit related literature has stressed the poten-
tial advantages associated with the strategic delegation of control unde full
information.2 In such a case, hiring an aggressive manager may lead the firm
to enjoy a dominant position replicating the performance of a Stackelberg
leader, provided that rivals remain entrepreneurial, i.e., strictly profit-seeking
units. It is worth noting that the two approaches rely upon very diﬀerent
presumptions and lead to strikingly diﬀerent conclusions, although the ob-
ject of their analyses is quite the same. According to agency theory, the
problem consists in preventing managers’ deviations from profit-maximising
strategies, through incentives that are linked to profits themselves, as they
are observable. By contrast, the theory of strategic delegation maintans that
managerial contracts must specifically allow for some weight attached to di-
mensional variables like revenues or market share, as this enhances the firm’s
equilibrium profits. Hence, what is assumed to be a bad thing in the for-
mer theory, turns out to be a good one in the latter. Which one shall we
believe to be more realistic? The purpose of the present paper is to propose
a perspective by which to address this question.
On of the most relevant aspects of a firms’ acitivities is investment; in
particular, all those activities that can be labelled as R&D, either for pro-
cess or for product innovation. Zhang and Zhang (1997) extend the strate-
gic delegation model to the analysis of cost-reducing R&D with spillovers,
(d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), comparing the performances of a duopoly
where both firms are either managerial or entrepreneurial. They find that
managerial firms invest more and earn lower profits than their managerial
counterparts. However, they do not consider the mixed case where a manage-
1See Holmstro¨m (1979, 1999); Grossman and Hart (1983); and Mirrlees (1999), inter
alia.
2To this regard, see Vickers (1985), Fershtman and Judd (1985), Sklivas (1987) and
Reitman (1993), inter alia.
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rial firm competes with an entrepreneurial one. My aim consists in showing
that, under some relevant respects, this situation closely reflects the current
state of the competition between firms located on the opposite sides of the
Atlantic.
If one compares the compensation accruing to the CEOs of, say, Ford,
Motorola and Boeing McDonnell Douglas with that of their counteparts at
VW-Audi, Nokia and Airbus, there emerges that, taking into account both
the regular wages and the stock options, the former receive several times as
much as the latter (see, e.g., Hutton, 2002, chs. 4 and 8). By the same token,
assessing the alleged mission of US vs European firms and how it translates
into their eﬀective behaviour, one very often verifies the following situation.
On the west side of the Atlantic, strict profit maximisation and high divend
distribution correspond to low R&D/revenues ratios, while the opposite holds
on the east side. While the objective of VW-Audi and Michelin consists in
keeping and possibly improving market shares and technological leadership,
that of Goodyear and Ford is to maximise the stockholders’ value. The new
Airbus A380 has required the investment of profits that, alternatively, could
have been distributed as dividends, which is indeed the route taken by the
CEOs of Boeing McDonnell Douglas. As a result, the potential competitor
of the A380, the Boeing 777, isn’t yet there.
On these basis, one may think that two significantly diﬀerent concepts
of managerialisation currently prevail in Europe and in the US, respectively.
More explicitly, there seems to be a correspondence between (i) the strategic
motive for delegation and the European approach to managerialisation, and
(ii) the incentive compatibility issue and the North American approach to
the separation between ownership and control.
To deal with this issue, I will examine an extension of Vickers’s (1985)
model where managers control both sales and R&D eﬀorts for process inno-
vation, a` la d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). This idea has already been
investigated by Zhang and Zhang (1997), confining however their attention to
the symmetric cases where all firms are either entrepreneurial or managerial.
Their conclusion is that delegating control to managers may indeed involve
higher investment levels, but surely entails lower profits as compared to the
situation where shareholders are directly in control of their firms, or equiva-
lently, design delegation contracts so as to keep managers completely aligned
with pure profit maximisation. Zhang and Zhang (1997) completely disre-
gard the asymmetric case where a managerial firm and an entrepreneurial one
interact. Perhaps, they do so because they are aware that managerialisation
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is a dominant strategy and therefore one should expect to observe separation
between ownership and control by all the firms alike. While this is surely
a sound conclusion in purely game-theoretical terms, it may nonetheless be
unrealistic, as the former examples tend to confirm.
The analysis of the asymmetric case leads to some neat results in line with
casual observation. First, the managerial firm’s R&D eﬀort and output are
both larger than the entrepreneurial firm’s. Consequently, the second result
is that at equilibrium the managerial firms earns higher profits than the rival.
An interesting ancillary conclusion is that, given that equilibrium marginal
costs are asymmetric to the advantage of the managerial firm, then there
exists an admissible parameter range wherein the entrepreneurial firm shuts
down and the managerial firm becomes a monopolist. It is worth stressing
that this is a direct consequence of the asymmetric R&D incentives. That is,
the diﬀerent rates of technical progress characterising the two firms determine
their long run performances and, ultimately, their ability to survive.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. The model is laid
out in section 2. Section 3 contains the analysis of the asymmetric case.
Concluding remarks are in section 4.
2 The model
Consider a Cournot duopoly where firms 1 and 2 supply a homogeneous good.
Market demand is:
p = a− q1 − q2 (1)
Each firm bears production costs Ci = ciqi, and the marginal cost ci cab be
reduced by investing in R&D activity, according to the following technology
(d’Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988):3
ci = c− ki − βkj . (2)
In (2), ki is the R&D eﬀort of firm i, while parameter β ∈ [0, 1] measures
the spillover that firm i receives from the rival. The cost of R&D activity is
Γi = bk2i , b > 0, to indicate that R&D is characterised by decreasing returns.
The resulting profit function is πi = (p− ci) qi − Γi.
3There exists a large literature on R&D with spillovers, which cannot be duly accounted
for here. See, e.g., Kamien et al. (1992), Suzumura (1992) and Amir (2000).
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Zhang and Zhang (1997) combine Fershtman and Judd’s (1985) approach
to managerial incentives as a linear combination of profits and sales, to the
linear-quadratic model of process R&D with spillovers due to d’Aspremont
and Jacquemin (1988). It can be easily shown that Fershtman and Judd’s
model is equivalent, up to a simple re-parametrisation, to Vickers’s (1985).4
Therefore, I will adopt the formulation introduced by Vickers, whereby the
incentive to firm i’s manager is a linear combination of profits and output:
Mi = πi + θiqi = (a− qi − qj) qi − (ci − θi) qi − bk2i (3)
where θi, the extent of delegation, is chosen by shareholders so as to maximise
profits. If θi = 0, then firm i’s shareholders either don’t hire a manager or
oblige her/him to strictly maximise profits.
A brief summary of the analysis contained in Zhang and Zhang (1997)
is in order. They compare the two symmetric games where either (i) both
firms hire a manager who decides how much to invest in R&D and how
much to produce, or (ii) neither firm hires a managers, so that ki and qi are
both chosen by shareholders to maximise profits. The latter case coincides
of course with d’Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988). The findings of Zhang
and Zhang’s model are the following (Zhang and Zhang, 1997, p. 394):
1. It is optimal to hire a manager (i.e., θ∗ > 0) only if the spillover pa-
rameter β is suﬃciently low. Otherwise, θ∗ = 0 and firms remain
entrepreneurial.
2. For all levels of β such that θ∗ > 0, managerial firms invest more in
R&D and produce than entrepreneurial firms. This also implies that
the equilibrium price is lower when the market is served by managerial
firms.
3. Consequently, managerial firms obtain lower profits than entrepreneurial
firms, for all levels of β such that θ∗ > 0.
The bottom line, although not explicitly stressed by Zhang and Zhang
(1997), is that managerialisation enhances technical progress but hinders
profits. In a sense, this setup has an Arrowian flaviour, as it reveals that
making a Cournot market more competitive by (symmetrically) hiring man-
agers with a taste for output expansion, ultimately leads to higher R&D
eﬀorts and lower production costs.
4The proof is omitted for brevity. See Lambertini and Trombetta (2002) for details.
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This suggests that shareholders should not like managerialisation. How-
ever, in game-theoretical terms, this may be an unavoidable outcome ensured
by the underlying prisoners’ dilemma driving the shareholders’ incentives to-
wards managerialisation, which is surely the case in the basic Cournot model
without R&D (Vickers, 1985; Lambertini and Trombetta, 2002). That is, if
the delegation of control to managers is a strictly dominant strategy, then
the resulting equilibrium outcome whereby both firms are managerial is com-
pelling, although Pareto-ineﬃcient from the shareholders’ standpoint. The
remainder of the paper focusses upon the asymmetric case where θi > 0
and θj = 0, i, j = 1, 2, i 6= j, in order to clarify that, if the rival firm is
entrepreneurial, then hiring an agressive manager yields superior productive
eﬃciency, a larger market share and higher profits for the managerial firm,
which under certain conditions may even become a monopolist. Therefore,
(i) delegation is indeed a dominant strategy, and (ii) adopting a strict profit-
maximising behaviour turns out to be myopic and counterproductive.
3 The asymmetric case
Under the assumption that firm i is managerial while firm j is entrepreneurial,
the three-stage game unravels as follows. In the first stage, firm i’s sharehold-
ers choose θi to maximise profits; in the second (third) stage, the manager of
firm i and the shareholders of firm j choose noncooperatively and simulta-
neously their respective R&D eﬀorts (output levels). As usual, the solution
concept is the subgame perfect equilibrium by backward induction.
The objective functions at the market stage are:
Mi = (a− qi − qj) qi − (ci − θi) qi − bk2i
πj = (p− cj) qj − bk2j
(4)
Taking the first order conditions (FOCs) w.r.t. qi and qj and solving, one
obtains:
q∗i =
a− 2ci + cj + 2θi
3
; q∗j =
a− 2cj + ci − θi
3
, (5)
which can be plugged intoMi and πj together with (2), to write the relevant
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objective functions at the second stage, where R&D eﬀorts are determined:
Mi =
1
9
£
(a− c)2 + (2ki − kj)2 − k2i
¡
9b+ 4β − β2
¢
− 4k2jβ (1− β)+
+4θ2i + 2 (a− c) (ki (2− β)− kj (2β − 1) + 2θi) + (6)
+2kikjβ (5− 2β) + 4θi (ki (2− β)− kj (2β − 1))]
πj =
[a− c+ ki (2β − 1) + kj (2− β)− θi]2
9
− bk2j . (7)
From (6-7), we can write the FOCs w.r.t. ki and kj :
∂Mi
∂ki
=
2
9
£
(a− c) (2− β) + ki
¡
4 (1− β)− 9b+ β2
¢
+
−kj
¡
2
¡
1− β2
¢
− 5β
¢
+ 2θi (2− β)
¤
= 0 (8)
∂πj
∂kj
= 2
·
(2− β) (a− c+ ki (2β − 1) + kj (2− β)− θi)
9
− bkj
¸
= 0. (9)
Solving the system (8-9), we obtain the equilibrium expressions of R&D
eﬀorts, for a generic value of θi :
k∗i =
(2− β) [(a− c) (2− 3b− β (3− β))− θi (6b+ β − 2)]
[9b− (2− β) (1 + β)] [2− 3b− β (3− β)] (10)
k∗j =
(2− β) [(a− c) (2− 3b− β (3− β)) + θi (3b− β (2− β))]
[9b− (2− β) (1 + β)] [2− 3b− β (3− β)] (11)
which clearly coincide with the optimal R&D eﬀorts in d’Aspremont and
Jacquemin (1988) iﬀ θi = 0. Substituting (10-11) into πi and solving ∂πi/∂θi =
0, the optimal extent of delegation is determined:5
θ∗i = Ψ ·
£
27b2 − 6b (2− β) (1 + β) + (2− β)2 (1 + β (3β − 2))
¤£
27b2 + 4 + 3b (2− β) (4β − 5)− β2 (15− β (13− 3β))
¤ (12)
where:
Ψ ≡ (a− c) (2− 3b− β (3− β))
2 (2− β − 6b) (13)
5Firm i’s FOC for profit maximisation is omitted for brevity. Details are available upon
request.
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If the ratio b/β is suﬃciently high, θ∗i is positive. For instance, if one takes
b = 1, then θ∗i > 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1] .
Having characterised the subgame perfect equilibrium, we can list the
equilibrium expressions of outputs, R&D eﬀorts and profits of the two firms:
q∗i =
9b (a− c) [3b− (2− β) (1− β)]
2
£
27b2 + 4 + 3b (2− β) (4β − 5)− β2 (15− β (13− 3β))
¤ (14)
q∗j =
3b (a− c) [3b− 4 + β (8− 3β)] [9b− (2− β) (1 + β)]
2 (6b+ β − 2)
£
27b2 + 4 + 3b (2− β) (4β − 5)− β2 (15− β (13− 3β))
¤
(15)
k∗i =
3 (a− c) (2− β) [3b− (2− β) (1− β)]
2
£
3b (2− β) (5− 4β)− 27b2 + (2− β)2 (β (3β − 1)− 1)
¤ (16)
k∗j =
(a− c) (2− β) [9b− (2− β) (1 + β)] [(2− β) (2− 3β)− 3b]
2 (6b+ β − 2)
£
3b (2− β) (5− 4β)− 27b2 + (2− β)2 (β (3β − 1)− 1)
¤
(17)
π∗i =
9b (a− c)2 [3b− (2− β) (1− β)]2
4 (6b+ β − 2)
£
27b2 + 4 + 3b (2− β) (4β − 5)− β2 (15− β (13− 3β))
¤
(18)
π∗j =
b (a− c) [3b− 4 + β (8− 3β)]2
£
9b− (2− β)2
¤
[9b− (2− β) (1 + β)]2
4 (6b+ β − 2)
£
27b2 + 4 + 3b (2− β) (4β − 5)− β2 (15− β (13− 3β))
¤
(19)
Likewise, one can also obtain the equilibrium espressions of marginal costs
and market price, which are omitted for brevity. Notice that, when compar-
ing equilibrium outputs, R&D eﬀorts and profits, the measure of market size,
a − c, is obviously irrelevant, such comparison depending upon {b, β} only.
In order to further simplify the matter, b can be normalised to one without
any further loss of generality. By doing so, the comparative evaluation of the
performance of the two firms can be carried out over the admissible interval
of the technological spillover β ∈ [0, 1] . The first relevant result is:
Remark 1 k∗i , q∗i > 0 for all β ∈ [0, 1] ; k∗j , q∗j > 0 for all β ∈ (0.131, 1] , and
conversely for all β ∈ [0, 0.131) .
That is, while the managerial firm is viable for all admissible spillover
levels, the entrepreneurial firm needs a suﬃciently high spillover from the
rival to be active. Moreover:
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Remark 2 k∗i > max
©
0, k∗j
ª
and q∗i > max
©
0, q∗j
ª
for all β ∈ [0, 1] .
These results can be interpreted as follows. The present model is one
where two asymmetric firms compete in output levels. In particular, the
asymmetry relates to their respective marginal costs, due to the fact that
R&D incentives are diﬀerent, since firm i has hired a manager while firm j
has not. As the manager has a taste for output expansion, she/he has also a
higher propensity to invest in process R&D, because an increase in productive
eﬃciency will bring about an increase in output. Therefore, a managerial firm
competing against an entrepreneurial firm, will invest more than the rival in
R&D activities. This ultimately implies that, as in any asymmetric Cournot
market, there exists a range of the cost diﬀerential cj − ci above which the
relatively less eﬃcient firm, in this case the entrepreneurial one, is thrown out
of business. Hence, π∗j = 0 for all β ∈ [0, 0.131) . Note that this conclusion
has a remarkable Schumpeterian flavour: R&D incentives reflect the relative
size (as measured by maket shares) and the profit performance of firms.
Remarks 1-2 entail:
Proposition 3 For all β ∈ [0, 0.131) , the managerial firm (i.e., firm i) is a
monopolist.
Finally, comparing (18) and (19), we obtain:
Proposition 4 π∗i > π∗j for all β ∈ (0.131, 1] .
The above Proposition of course replicates the result we know since the
seminal paper by Vickers (1985). However, in the present model, a novel
result adds to the picture. More precisely, it is worth stressing that, if firms
endogenously control their reciprocal spillovers, then it is possible for the
managerial firm to monopolise the market by keeping the spillover outgoing
to the rival low enough to lead the entrepreneurial firm to shut down. This
would require, of course, rearranging the model by making spillovers βi and
βj, firm-specific. However, even in the case of exogenously given external
eﬀects, it is quite sensible to presume that the eﬀective spillover that each
firm receives from the rival be smaller than 10% (see, e.g., Jaﬀe, 1986). In
such a case, the empirical relevance of Proposition 3 would be non-negligible.
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4 Concluding remarks
I have examined R&D competition between a managerial firm and an en-
trepreneurial one, in a Cournot market. Although seemingly at odds with
the economic incentives that should lead to a separation between ownership
and control within all firms alike, this appears to be a relevant situation in
view of the current state of competition on the opposite shores of the At-
lantic, with firms behaving as short termers in the US vis a` vis their more
forward looking counterparts in Western Europe. While the former set of
firms provides their managers with large incentives in order for them to align
to profit maximisation, the latter group of firms has a looser hold on man-
agers, who may consequently reinvest profits into long-term development
plans. The outcome of the simple theoretical model I have exposed seem
to be in line with observation, i.e., it predicts that delegation to managers
interested in output expansion will translate into larger R&D eﬀorts and pro-
ductive eﬃciency as compared to the performance of a strictly profit-seeking
firm. This may ultimately yield monopoly power for the managerial firm, if
technological spillovers in the industry are low enough.
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